Multiple level access system

ABSTRACT

A method of securing an object at an access level includes selecting a profile for a user, including a credential having an encrypted credential public key, an encrypted credential public key encryption key, and a multiple-level access identifier. A working key is generated by binding a domain value with a random value. The object is encrypted with the working key. A random value encryption key is generated based on the shared value by decrypting the credential public key encryption key with the profile key encryption key, decrypting the credential public key with the credential public key encryption key, generating an ephemeral key pair, and generating a shared value based on the ephemeral private key and the credential public key. The random value is encrypted with the random value encryption key, and the encrypted object, the ephemeral public key, and the encrypted random value are provided for an authorized recipient.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This is a divisional of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/870,250,which was filed on Jun. 16, 2004, which in turn was a continuation ofU.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/060,011, which was filed on Jan. 30,2002, and is related to U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No.60/264,715, filed on Jan. 30, 2001, co-pending U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 09/023,672, filed on Feb. 13, 1998, co-pending U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 09/418,806, filed on Oct. 15, 1999, and co-pendingU.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/060,039, filed on Jan. 30, 2002. Thedisclosures of all the related applications are incorporated herein intheir entireties.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

Generally, the present invention relates to techniques for controllingaccess to computer-based systems. In particular, the present inventionrelates to techniques for providing multiple-level access control toobjects in a computer system.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Access control can be defined as enforcing data-use or other object-usepermissions that grant or deny access to content or applications. Inthis context, data-use can include a broad selection of functions suchas reading, changing, executing, creating, overwriting, or deleting. Theability to change access permissions is another type of access that canbe granted or denied.

Access control should be considered in a system approach in which astrong user (entity or member) identification and authorization (I&A)process plays a role. An exemplary system for user identification isdescribed in a co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/060,039,filed on Jan. 30, 2002, the entire disclosure of which is incorporatedherein by this reference.

Thus, the goal is to provide access control to objects such as data andapplications. It should be flexible and suitable for implementing avariety of different schemes, such as discretionary access controls(DAC) and mandatory access controls (MAC). The key management systemshould be suitable for implementing a role-based access control system(RBAC). These controls should support content-based access controlarchitectures that provide a very granular object level enforcement orthat enable an expanded access.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE PRESENT INVENTION

It is therefore an objective of the present invention to enforce domainmember access control to CKM labeled data with cryptography—i.e. byusing symmetric key algorithms, asymmetric key algorithms andcryptographic hash functions.

It is another objective of the present invention to enforce domainmember access control to applications.

It is an additional objective of the present invention to controlencryption (write) and decryption (read) of objects based on the contentof the object.

It is also an objective of the present invention to allow credentialapplication to restrict or broaden readership of labeled objects.

It is another objective of the present invention to provide a userinterface paradigm that is intuitive and easy to use.

It is an additional objective of the present invention to providesensitivity level or multiple-level access control such that access tocredentials is dependant on the method of member identification.

It is also an objective of the present invention to enforce domainauthority-dictated policies for multiple-level access control bycredential category.

According to an exemplary aspect of the invention, a user's profile(“user profile”) determines whether and how the user can encrypt (write)and decrypt (access) an object, which can be, for example, a datainstance or a computer program. A user profile includes at least onecredential, and each credential includes one or both of an asymmetrickey pair: a credential public key (write authority) and a credentialprivate key (access authority).

A user can encrypt (or write) an object with one or more particularcredential public keys included in the user's profile, such thatsubsequent decryption of the encrypted object by another user (or theoriginal user) requires corresponding or otherwise authorizedcredentials. Accordingly, a user can decrypt an encrypted object if theuser possesses, in that user's profile, credentials corresponding tothose with which the encrypted object was encrypted. A user can selectone or more credentials with which to interact with a particular objector objects in general, or selection of credentials can be automated.

A credential and an object can correspond to a multiple-level accesslevel (“MLA level”) to effectuate a partitioned-access scheme, anaccess-up scheme, or an access-down scheme for encryption and decryptionof objects. The MLA level of a credential can be assigned by a domainauthority, whereas the MLA level of an object can be assigned based onthe object's content or based on the credential(s) used to encrypt theobject.

A user profile and one or more credentials included in the profile canbe secured, in whole or in part, through one or more levels ofencryption. Thus, a user can obtain access to the user's respective userprofile and one or more particular credentials contained in the profileby providing the requisite data for respective decryption of the profileor the credentials. The requisite data can be encryption scheme data(such as one or more encryption keys, algorithm identifiers, keyqualifiers, or algorithm qualifiers, for example) or instances of keyingdata used to generate encryption scheme data. Further, a user canprovide the requisite data as required or during an identificationprotocol through which the user obtains access to the computer system.In either case, the requisite data can be preexisting or generated, inwhole or in part, such as through a user identification andauthorization scheme.

Access controls according to the present invention are enforced usingcryptographic algorithms, either proprietary or standards-based. Basicread and write access is correlated to decrypt and encrypt access,respectively, through credentials. These credentials can also definedifferent access sensitivity levels based on defined I&A. Credentialscan also control access to applications.

The present invention extends enforcement through read and write accesscontrols, using cryptography, whereas most systems, such as computeroperating systems, use software to provide access enforcement. Thesystem of the present invention can be used alone, or with operatingsystem access controls to provide greater security. For example, thepresent invention can provide cryptographic enforcement of a computerfile system read and write controls.

These models offer a flexible approach to I&A and can allow the domainauthority to tailor I&A policies for a particular domain. The presentinvention can be viewed as defining different I&A schemes with differentrelative assurance levels that can be used within a single domain.

According to a particular aspect of the present invention, in amulti-level access system, a method of securing an object at amultiple-level access level includes receiving, from a user, a profilekey encryption key corresponding to the multiple-level access level,selecting an object to secure, and selecting a profile associated withthe user. The profile includes a domain value, an encrypted profileencryption key, and a credential. The credential includes an encryptedcredential public key, an encrypted credential public key encryptionkey, and a multiple-level access identifier. The method also includesselecting the credential based on a comparison of the multiple-levelaccess level and the multiple-level access identifier, and generating aworking key. Generating the working key includes generating a randomvalue, and binding at least the domain value and the random valuetogether to form the working key. The method also includes encryptingthe object with the working key, and generating a random valueencryption key. Generating the random value encryption key includesdecrypting the encrypted credential public key encryption key with atleast the profile key encryption key, decrypting the encryptedcredential public key with at least the decrypted credential public keyencryption key, generating an ephemeral key pair including an ephemeralprivate key and an ephemeral public key, generating a shared value basedon at least the ephemeral private key and the decrypted credentialpublic key, and generating the random value encryption key based on atleast the shared value. The method also includes encrypting the randomvalue with at least the random value encryption key, and providing theencrypted object, the ephemeral public key, and the encrypted randomvalue for an authorized recipient. The profile can also include aprofile initialization vector, in which case decrypting the encryptedcredential public key encryption key can also include decrypting theencrypted credential public key encryption key with the profile keyencryption key and the profile initialization vector. The credential canalso include a credential initialization vector, in which casedecrypting the encrypted credential public key can include decryptingthe encrypted credential public key with the decrypted credential publickey encryption key and the credential initialization vector. Themultiple-level access level can correspond to the multiple-level accessidentifier, or the multiple-level access level can be identical to themultiple-level access identifier, lower than the multiple-level accessidentifier, or higher than the multiple-level access identifier.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWING FIGURES

FIG. 1 is a table showing a summary of combinations of read and writepermissions.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating the selection of credentials torestrict access according to an exemplary embodiment of the presentinvention.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating the selection of credentials tobroaden access according to an exemplary embodiment of the presentinvention.

FIG. 4 is an illustration of the threshold method of implementingmultiple credential selection categories.

FIG. 5 is a table showing an exemplary set of credentials that areavailable for a given log-in MLA level and defined access type.

FIG. 6 is a table showing exemplary respective relationships betweencredential private key encryption keys and between credential public keyencryption keys.

FIG. 7 is a table showing an exemplary encrypted member profile and keysaccording to the present invention.

FIG. 8 is a block diagram showing steps in decrypting a member profile.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT INVENTION

Generally, according to the present invention, a computer systemincludes a user profile for each user of the system. A user profile isused to determine whether and how the user can encrypt (write) anddecrypt (access) an object, which can be, for example, a data instanceor a computer program.

A user profile includes at least one credential, and each credentialincludes one or both of an asymmetric key pair: a credential public key(write authority), and a credential private key (access authority). Theuse of a particular credential can be write-only, access-only, or writeand access authorized.

A user can write (or secure) a preexisting object, which might beunsecured or already secured, or a new object created by the user, suchas an electronic communication. A user secures an object by accessing atleast one credential included in the user's user profile, and encryptingthe object with the respective public key of each of the at least oneaccessed credential, such that subsequent access to the secured objectrequires access to corresponding or otherwise authorized credentials.

A user can access a secured object if the user possesses credentialscorresponding to those with which the secured object was encrypted.

A credential or an object can have a respective MLA level associatedwith it. A user can secure an object at one or more respective accesslevels with one or more accessed credentials, such that subsequentaccess to the secured object requires access to corresponding orqualified credentials. Access levels can correspond to a partitionedaccess scheme, an access up scheme, or an access up scheme in regards toencryption and decryption. Different schemes can be selected for writeand read control.

A user can control the access level available to the user by selectingone or more of the user's credentials either at the time an object is tobe encrypted or decrypted, or during implementation of an identificationprotocol through which the user obtains access to the computer system.

A user profile and one or more credentials contained in the user profilecan be secured, in whole or in part, through one or more levels ofencryption. Thus, a user can obtain access to the user's respective userprofile and one or more particular credentials included in the profileby providing the requisite data for respective decryption of the profileor the credentials. The requisite data can be encryption scheme data(such as one or more encryption keys, algorithm identifiers, keyqualifiers, or algorithm qualifiers) or instances of keying data used togenerate encryption scheme data. Further, a user can provide therequisite data as required or during an identification protocolimplementation through which the user obtains access to the computersystem. In either case, the requisite data can be preexisting orgenerated, in whole or in part, such as through a combining or bindingprocedure.

In constructing an object encryption key (or session key), the paradigmof the present invention includes a random value. The random value isencrypted using the public part of an asymmetric key pair. Toreconstruct the object encryption key, the random value must first bedecrypted using the corresponding private part of the asymmetric keypair. Enforcement through read and write access control is based onsharing the private and public keys, respectively. The key pairs aredirectly correlated to credentials that are associated with labels orinformation content. By using more than one key pair to encrypt anddecrypt the random value, access can be restricted or broadened.

Asymmetric Key Credentials

A credential is a key pair used for access control. The public key iscalled the write credential and the private key the read credential.

A credential or set of credentials can define a role. In the system ofthe present invention, domain members can be assigned to one or moreroles and have access rights that correspond to the credentials withinthat role. Applying a credential during encryption under this system canbe referred to as labeling.

The application of the scheme of the present invention is embodied inthe labeling of an object. When a credential is applied, the public keyassociated with that credential is used in the encryption process. Theprivate key associated with that same credential must be available inorder to be able to decrypt the object. Possession of public and privatekeys is the basis of read and write access control in the system of thepresent invention.

Credentials that Restrict Access

A single credential can be used during a session, and simultaneous useof more than one credential is also allowed. A user is required to haveread access to all of the credentials that were used for sessionencryption before decryption is possible. This means that addingcredentials during encryption has the effect of restricting readershipwithin the domain.

Credentials can be grouped into categories for ease of use. Generally,within a category, credentials will be related. An example of a categoryis “country”. Credentials in this category might include “U.S.”,“Canada”, “Germany”, “England”, and so on. Selecting “U.S.” from thecountry category as a credential during encryption would limitreadership of the encrypted object to those who have read access to the“U.S.” credential. Another example of a category is “security level”.Credentials found in this category could be “Top Secret”, “Secret”,“Confidential”, or “Sensitive But Unclassified”. Thus, selecting“Secret” from the security level category as a credential duringencryption would limit readership of the encrypted object to those whohave read access to the “Secret” credential.

Given that credentials within a category are related, applying multiplecredentials by selecting one credential from each category duringencryption is contemplated. For example, selecting “Secret” from thesecurity level category, and “U.S.” from the country category wouldlimit readership even more as only those who have both the “U.S.” andthe “Secret” credential could decrypt the object. This is an example ofadding credentials that restrict readership.

Note that credentials within a category can be mutually exclusive, asfor example, the country category above where each credential can betaken without reference to a role or member's association. However,credentials can also be inclusive, such as those in the security levelcategory, in which it can be defined that credentials to a particularsecurity level can include credentials to all security levels lower thanthat level. The partitioning of the “Top Secret”, “Secret”, and“Confidential” read and write access would depend on assigning thesecredentials to identified roles that are associated with the members.

Credentials that Broaden Access

The system architecture gains more flexibility if credentials areallowed to broaden readership in addition to restricting readership.Broadening access can be managed by allowing multiple credentials withina particular category to be chosen. In this case, a member would berequired to have read access for only one of the credentials that wereused for encryption within that category. This is known as “either-or”capability, because either of the credentials is required fordecryption.

Referring back to the previous example, choosing both the “Canada” andthe “U.S.” credentials from within the country category will allow userswith either read access for “Canada” or read access for “U.S.”, theability to decrypt. Adding credentials by selecting more than onecredential within a category broadens readership.

There is a danger that for categories that have inclusive typecredentials, it is possible for a member to misuse this accessbroadening mechanism. For example, it defeats the purpose to label dataas both “Top Secret” and “Confidential”. In this case, credentialsshould be bound to the I&A process to differentiate a member's accessrights.

Credentials that have Different Sensitivity

Different user identification factors can be used alone or togetheraccording to the present invention to create different I&A schemes, suchas that defined in the co-pending I&A patent application citedpreviously. More than one scheme can be defined within a domain.Security levels, risk assessment levels, or assurance levels may berelated to different schemes. These schemes are assigned a Multi-LevelAccess (MLA) level. A domain member can have a choice of which I&Ascheme to use for login depending on the assigned relative securitylevel.

Credentials are assigned to an MLA level. Whether the use of aparticular credential is permitted depends on the MLA level of the I&Ascheme that was used for login.

For a login of a given security level, three possibilities exist forread access and for write access—only those credentials at the samelevel as the login are accessible, those at the same level and up areaccessible, or those at the same level and down are accessible. Thefirst type of access is called partitioned access, the second typeaccess up, and the last access down. Combinations of all access typesresult in nine different ways to handle multi-level read and writeaccess. The choice of access type will depend on the domain environmentand domain policy.

In FIG. 1, the symbol, -, represents permission to use credentials onlyat the same level as I&A, ↑ represents permission to use credentials atthe same level as I&A or above, and ↓ represents permission to usecredentials at the same level as I&A or below.

As an illustration, consider the Bell-LaPadula model, which is usedwithin the military environment. This corresponds to combination 8 inFIG. 1 and can be summarized as “read-down/write-up”. Translated for thepresent invention, this means that credentials at or above the currentlogin level can be used for encryption, and data that has been encryptedwith credentials at or below the current login level can be decrypted.Using the examples from above, logging in at the lowest level wouldenable the member to encrypt using all of the credentials in thesecurity level category for encryption. However, only data encryptedusing credentials at the lowest level, say “Confidential”, can bedecrypted. Logging in at the highest level would enable the member toencrypt data using “Top Secret” only, but would allow decryption of datathat used any of the credentials within the security level category.

A domain can selectively apply an MLA level to a category. In theprevious example, MLA was applied to the “security level” category,whereas the “country” category was not subject to MLA.

Access Control Through Symmetric Key Algorithms

The symmetric key cryptographic algorithms that are used for objectencryption can be used to control access. The ability of a member to usea specific algorithm can be allocated to roles as another factorenforcing access control. The selection of algorithms can be defined bythe domain.

For example, members who are in the U.S. might have all algorithmsincluding AES with all key sizes while those in England might have128-bit AES or use a proprietary algorithm. Other countries might useDES, while others might use 40-bit RC2. The selection of availablealgorithms can be defined through national policy.

The symmetric algorithm access process can be complemented with MLA. Thealgorithms available to a member would also then depend on the securitylevel of the member login process. The combination of algorithm accessand MLA offers a more balanced security approach. Data that is moresensitive requires stronger algorithms together with stronger user I&A.

Access to Applications

Access to applications and associated credentials can also becontrolled. Each application, along with the list of credentials thatare valid for each application, is assigned to a member. The applicationcredentials will be contained in the member's profile that is defined,for example, through the runtime environment of the key managementsystem. Only the credentials that appear in the list can be used withthe application. The I&A process validates a member to his or herprofile for further decryption of the profile. After the profile isdecrypted, the application-credentials are available for accessingprescribed applications. The key management runtime environmentprotocol, for example, enforces the access to an application.

Additional integrity can be included in the application-credentialprocess. The application's file (or an element of the file) and the listof associated credentials can be digitally signed by the domainauthority. To access an application, a member must have the digitalsignature in his or her profile, as well as at least one of thecredentials associated with the application. When the applicationstarts, the key management runtime environment requests the signaturefrom the member's profile. If there is no signature, the application isnot accessed. If the signature is available, it will be verified againstthe application file and the list of credentials associated with thatapplication. If the signature verifies correctly, access is granted. Theruntime environment will only allow the member to use the set ofcredentials that the domain authority has associated with theapplication.

Implementation

Credentials Available

Different I&A methods correspond to different MLA levels depending onthe domain policy. The result of a successful login is a value that isused as a symmetric cryptographic key.

Each credential has an MLA level associated with it. When MLA is used,then the credentials that are available will depend on the level of theI&A scheme used to login. MLA levels are represented by the number 0,and by integers starting from 1. A credential assigned to level 0 isspecial; this signifies that the credential is exempt from MLA.Beginning with level 1, higher levels can represent different levels ofsecurity, for example, stronger security. MLA exemption will be ineffect for all credentials within a given category, that is, individualcredentials, while flagged with level 0, are not individually given MLAexemption—only categories are. Those credentials in the categories thatare exempt from MLA (as determined by the domain authority) are alwaysavailable.

For credentials in categories that are subject to MLA, access is grantedif the credential MLA level corresponds to the I&A level. This is truewhether partitioned access, access up, or access down is specified.

For encryption, if write-up is specified by the domain authority, thenthe public keys for all credentials with MLA level greater than the I&Alevel will also be available. If write-down is specified, then thepublic keys for levels below the I&A level will be available forencryption.

Similarly for decryption, if read-up is specified, then private keys forcredentials with MLA level greater than the I&A level will be available.If read-down is specified, then private keys for credentials with MLAlevel below the I&A level will be available.

Profile Encryption

Encryption of credentials within a member's profile is the basis forenforcing multiple level access. Credential private and public keys areencrypted with a key corresponding to the MLA level assigned to thecredential. These credential encryption keys (CEKs)—the credentialprivate key encryption keys and credential public key encryptionkeys—appear in the profile as ciphertext. The encryption key for eachCEK is derived from the I&A value of the corresponding level.

Any suitable proprietary or standard symmetric key algorithm can be usedfor profile encryption. For example, triple DES (3×DES) is a currentstandard symmetric key algorithm suitable for profile encryption. Areplacement algorithm for 3×DES known as the Advanced EncryptionAlgorithm (AES) will soon be an official standard. AES in eight bitcipher feedback (CFB8) mode can be used to encrypt the member's profile.The profile encryption key (PEK) is 128 bits for the key plus 128 bitsfor an initialization vector (IV), for a total of 256 bits. The IV usedfor the profile is a random string that is stored as plaintext withinthe profile. The key portion of the PEK is encrypted using the I&Aderived value as the basis for the profile key encryption key (PKEK). Ifmore than one level of I&A is used, such as with MLA, then there will bemore than one PKEK. CFB8 mode is presented as an exemplary keyalgorithm, so that each item in the profile can be encrypted withoutregard for padding issues.

To implement read-up or read-down, the credential private key encryptionkeys are related to each other. Similarly, to implement write-up orwrite-down, the credential public key encryption keys are related toeach other. The relationships are defined below. There four types ofcredential access: MLA exempt credential access, partitioned access,access up, and access down.

MLA Exempt Credentials: If the credential is exempt from MLA, then thecredential encrypting keys and initialization vector are the same as theprofile encrypting key and IV.

Partitioned Access: For partitioned access, the credential encryptingkey is just the value derived from the I&A process of the correspondinglevel.

Access Up: For access up, the credential encryption key for the lowestlevel is generated at random. Credential encryption keys at other levelsare derived from this first key in such a way that key values of levelsabove any level can be derived but key values of the levels belowcannot. For example, a one-way hash function (OWHF) such as SHA256 isused.

Access Down: For access down, the credential encryption key for thehighest level is generated. Credential encryption keys at lower levelsare derived from this key in such a way that key values of levels belowsome given level can be derived but key values of levels above cannot.For example, a OWHF such as SHA256 is used.

Random Value Encryption Key Generation

There are two random values associated with the key management processof the present invention: a random value that is used in theconstruction of a working key, and an ephemeral key pair that is used inthe encryption and decryption of the first random value.

A combiner, or binder, is the function that produces a working key, thatis, the key used for object encryption. An exemplary combiner isdescribed in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/023,672. The combinertakes three key inputs: a domain value, a domain maintenance value, anda random value. Domain and maintenance values are included in a member'sprofile but the random value must be sent or kept with the encryptedobject. The random value changes with the creation of a new working key.Credentials that are chosen for use in the encryption process are usedto encrypt this random value. The encryption of the random value with akey derived from the chosen credentials is the basis of assigning accesspermissions and enforcing access control to encrypted objects.

Each instance of an object encryption results in a new random value andDiffie-Hellmen ephemeral key pair generation. For encryption, theephemeral private key is used with each chosen credential public key tocompute shared values. The ephemeral public key is sent with theencrypted object for use during decryption. For decryption, theephemeral public key will be used with each credential private key torecreate the shared values. From these shared values, a random valueencryption key (REK) is calculated.

Restricting Access Credentials

To use credentials that only restrict access, the REK is built from allof the shared values. This requires possession of all of the credentialprivate keys (read permissions) in a member's profile for decryption. Tomanage this effectively, credentials are partitioned into categories andthe user interface will only allow one credential to be chosen percategory.

The REK is produced from the shared values by binding using, forexample, the combiner noted above, to generate a key from shared values.AES in ECB mode can be used, for example, to encrypt the random value,in which case 128 bits of key are needed. Using this exemplary algorithmwould mean that the basic method of generating the REK is to concatenatethe shared values, a counter value, which is the string value0000000116, and some “other” information, which in this case can be thecredential indices, concatenated in order. This value is then hashedusing SHA256 and the most significant 128 bits from this hashed value isused for the REK. See FIG. 2.

As shown in the figure, during object encryption, a member chooses whichcredentials to apply. In this example, no more than one credential percategory can be chosen. As shown, Credential 3 is selected from CategoryA, and Credential 14 is selected from Category B. Thus, read permissionsfor both credentials are required to be able to decrypt the encryptedobject. That is, access is granted to decrypt only if read permission(knowledge of private keys) is available for all credentials that wereused to encrypt.

Broadening Access Credentials

For credentials that broaden access, a different implementation is used.The user interface will allow multiple credentials within a category tobe selected. This is interpreted as the requirement to have read accessto at least one of the chosen credentials in each category to enabledecryption. A category for which this applies is called a multiplecredential selection category (MCSC). See FIG. 3.

As shown in the figure, during object encryption, a member selects whichcredentials to apply. More than one credential can be selected formwithin a category if that category is a MCSC. In the example shown, onecredential (Top Secret) is selected from the Security Level category,and two credentials (Canada and United States) are selected from theCountry category. Thus, read permissions for Top Secret and eitherCanada or United States are required to be able to decrypt the object.That is, access is granted to decrypt if read permission (knowledge ofprivate key) is available for any one credential that was used toencrypt in a MCSC, as well as read permission for a credential form anyother category.

One solution is to encrypt the random value multiple times with multiplekeys. In general, there is a key for each combination of credentials.Let s₁ be the number of credentials chosen for the first MCSC, s₂ forthe second, and so on. Then, for n MCSC categories there are m_(L) REKs,where m_(L) is the product of all the s_(i), that is,m _(L)=Π_(i=1) ^(n) s _(i)Each REK then would be the product of n shared values, that is, oneshared value per category. This also implies that m_(L) encryptions ofthe random value will be performed with m_(L) different keys and m_(L)times as much space will be required for the encrypted random value tobe kept with the encrypted object in the header. This solution is calledthe lockbox method.

However, another solution based upon using a (2, s_(i)+1) thresholdscheme will, in some cases, involve less data to store than the multipleREKs of the lockbox method. This method is called the threshold method.Using the Shamir Threshold Scheme, a threshold key is generated ands_(i)+1 threshold shares are created for MCSC i. The key set used can beany sufficiently large prime number. The domain-wide Diffie-Hellmanparameter p_(c), for example, can be used for the key set.

From the Diffie-Hellman shared value calculated for each credentialwithin a MCSC, an AES key is calculated by binding as described above,using a counter of 00000001₁₆ and the credential index as “other”information. These s_(i) derived keys are used to encrypt s_(i) of thethreshold shares with AES. These are done in order, that is, the derivedkey corresponding to the lowest index credential is used to encrypt thesecond share. The first share remains plaintext.

The threshold key for each category is used like a shared value in thecomputation of the REK. The combiner method is again used, but with thethreshold keys for the MCSC categories instead of Diffie-Hellman sharedvalues and “other” information constructed from the number ofcredentials selected from each MCSC category.

FIG. 4 gives an overview of an exemplary threshold method ofimplementing multiple credential selection categories. The MCSC categoryis “Country” and two credentials have been selected, that is, “Canada”and “United States” which in this example have credential IDs of 13 and14.

The information included with the encrypted object will include oneencrypted random value, a plaintext threshold share per category, and atotal of Σ_(i=1) ^(n)s_(i) encrypted threshold shares. If the number ofitems to be included with the encrypted object is denoted as m_(T), thenm _(T)=1+n+Σ _(i=1) ^(n) s _(i)

If one category is used with multiple credentials, then the thresholdscheme will produce two more items in the header, compared to thelockbox method. However, if more than one category has multiplecredentials and more than three credentials are chosen within thesecategories, the threshold method will produce fewer items. The morecredentials within each category that are chosen, the better thethreshold scheme is, in terms of space resources, over the generalproduct method.

Another method of implementing access-broadening credentials is togenerate a 128-bit random value per category. These values are calledREK_(i), where the index i represents the category with which it isassociated. The random value is only encrypted once with the REK. TheREK is calculated as the exclusive-OR value of all the REK_(i).

For each credential chosen within a category, the REK_(i) is encrypted.The credential public key and ephemeral private key are used to derive ashared value as the basis of the encryption key. The key derivationfunction of the binder as discussed previously can be used to calculatethe encryption keys.

The extra information to be included with the encrypted object is simplyn 128-bit encrypted values, where the value n is just the total numberof credentials chosen.

Details

Symbols

-   e(x, y) AES encryption (in ECB mode) of x using y as the key. The    values, x and y, are 128 bits.-   e(x, y, z) AES encryption (in CFB8 mode) of x using y as the key and    z as the IV. All values are 128 bits.-   d(x, y) AES decryption (in ECB mode, 128 bit key) of x using y as    the key.-   d(x, y, z) AES decryption (in CFB8 mode, 128 bit key and IV) of x    using y as the key and z as the IV.-   ⊕ Exclusive-OR operation.-   ⊕_(i=1) ^(n)x_(i) Exclusive-OR all values of x_(i) together from i=1    to n.-   ∥_(iεS)x_(i) Concatenate the x_(i) values together for all i in the    set S.-   H^(y)(x) Cryptographic hash of x, applied y times-   H′(x, n, o) The combiner method of generating a key from shared    value x using counters up to n and other information o.-   κ_(λ) The key derived from I&A events specified for MLA level λ.-   λ_(max) Represents the maximum MLA level.-   λ(c) Represents the MLA level of credential c.-   P Represents data stored in a member's profile.-   A Represents the set of credentials available to a member at a given    time.-   S Represents the set of credentials chosen by the member for    encryption.-   c_(max) The maximum number of credentials within a domain. Typically    this is 28 (256) or 216 (65,536).-   p_(c), q_(c), g_(c) Combiner Diffie-Hellman parameters.-   X_(i) Private key associated with credential i.-   Y_(i) Public key associated with credential i.-   Z_(i) Computed shared value for credential i, (uses ephemeral keys).-   r Ephemeral private key.-   t Ephemeral public key.-   K_(i) Threshold key for category i.    Mathematical Description

Credentials Available

If MLA is not used, the set of credentials available to a member are allcredentials that appear in the member's profile, that is, ∀cεP.

In general, a credential is represented by an 5-tuple, (cid, d_(c),x_(c), y_(c), λ_(c)), where cid is the credential index, d_(c) is thecategory, x_(c) is the private key for the credential, y_(c) is thepublic key for the credential and λ_(c) is the MLA level defined for thecredential by the domain authority. Note that within a profile, theprivate key can be missing for some credentials. This impliesencrypt-only (or write-only) permission for that credential.

Credentials that are in categories that are exempt from MLA (asdetermined by the domain authority) are always available. This set ofcredentials is{∀cεP|λ _(c)=0}  (1)

The table shown in FIG. 5 summarizes the set of credentials that areavailable to a member who has logged in using an MLA level of λ_(1A).The access type corresponds to the combinations from the table in FIG.1.

The set described in eq. (1) in union with the one of the sets above(which depends upon domain policy) will be represented as ∀cεA, where Ais the set of available credentials per login.

Encryption of Member's Profile

Encryption of Profile Data Excluding Credentials

The profile is encrypted with a profile encryption key, PEK and aninitialization vector, PIV. The PIV is stored in the profile inplaintext form. The PEK is encrypted λ_(max) times, where λ_(max) is thenumber of MLA levels used. The term ePEK_(λ) represents the encryptedvalue of the PEK for MLA level λ as stored in the profile,ePEK _(λ) =e(PEK, κ _(λ) , PIV) (2)

where κ_(λ) is the key derived from all I&A events that are defined forMLA level λ.

For decryption, a member completes a successful login at MLA level λ,regenerating the key κ_(λ), and then recovering the PEK from ePEK_(λ),which will allow decryption of the rest of the profile.PEK=d(ePEK _(λ), κ_(λ) , PIV)  (3)Encrypting Credentials in the Member's Profile

Public and private keys are encrypted in the profile. The 5-tuplecorresponding to credential c is stored in the profile as (cid, d_(c),ex_(c), ey_(c), λ_(c)), whereex _(c) =e(x _(c) , xek _(c) , XIV _(c))  (4a)ey _(c) =e(y _(c) , yek _(c) , YIV _(c))  (4b)

are the encrypted credential private and public keys. The xek_(c) andyek_(c) are credential private and public key encrypting keys, andXIV_(c) and YIV_(c) are private key and public key initializationvectors, respectively.

MLA Exempt Credentials

If the credential is exempt from MLA, then the credential encryptingkeys and initialization vector are the same as the profile encryptingkey and IV.

∀cεP∃3. λ_(c)=0xek _(c) =yek _(c) =PEK  (5a)XIV _(c) −YIV _(c) −PIV  (5b)MLA Subject Credentials

There will be λ_(max) initialization vectors corresponding to each MLAlevel and represented as PIV_(λ).

∀cεP∃. λ_(c)≠0, and ∀λ∃1≦λ≦λ_(max,)XIV _(c) =YIV _(c) =PIV _(λc)  (6)

Each PIV_(λ) is stored as plaintext in the profile.

Partitioned Access

For credential read or write partitioned access, the encrypting key isjust the value derived from the I&A process. For read partitionedaccess,xek_(c)=κ_(λc)  (7a)

For write partitioned access,yek_(c)=κ_(λc)  (7b)Access Up and Down

There will be λ_(max) credential private key encryption keys, andλ_(max) credential public key encrypting keys. These keys arerepresented by xek_(λ), and yek_(λ) respectively, where λ corresponds toan MLA level. Each xek_(λ) and yek_(λ) are stored encrypted in theprofile using the value derived from the I&A process for the respectivelevel as the key.

For 1≦λ≦λ_(max)exek _(λ) =e(xek _(λ), κ_(λ) , PIV)  (8a)eyek _(λ) =e(yek _(λ), κ_(λ) , PIV)  (8b)

and to recover the xek_(λ) and yek_(λ)xek _(λ) =d(exek _(λ), κ_(λ) , PIV)  (9a)yek _(λ) =d(eyek _(λ), κ_(λ) , PIV)  (9b)

For read-up or down access, the credential private key encryption keysarexek_(c)=xek_(λc)  (10a)

For write-up or down access, the credential public key encryption keysareyek_(c)=yek_(λc)  (10b)

For access up, an encrypting key for I&A level 1 is generated at random.All access up type encryption keys are derived from this value. Theencrypting keys for I&A level other than the one used for I&A can thenbe derived from the encrypting key for level λ_(1A).

For read-upxek _(c)=(H ^((λc−λ1A)) xek _(λ1A))/2^((h−k))  (11a)

For write-upyek _(c)=(H ^((λc−λ1A)) yek _(λ1A))/2^((h−k))  (11b)

where h is the output size of the hash function and k is the keysize ofthe credential encryption algorithm, in bits. The meaning of division by2^((h−k)) is that the derived key value is taken as the most significantk bits of the hashed value. For two-key triple DES and the SHA1 hashfunction (h−k) is 48. For AES (128-bit key) and SHA256 (256-bit output)this value is 128. For AES (256-bit key) and SHA256 (256-bit output)this value is 0.

Note that for read-up or write-up credentials, if λ_(1A)>λ_(c), accessto the credential c read or write value is denied.

For access down, an encrypting key for I&A level λ_(max) is generated atrandom. The encrypting keys for I&A level other than λ_(max) are derivedfrom the encrypting key for level λ_(max). All access down typeencryption keys are derived from this value. The encrypting keys for I&Alevel other than the one used for I&A can then be derived from theencrypting key for level λ_(1A).

For read-upxek _(c)=(H ^((λ1A−λc))(xek _(λ1A)))/2^((h−k))  (12a)

For write-upyek _(c) =H ^((λ1A−λc))(yek _(λ1A))/2^((h−k))  (12b)

For read-down or write-down credentials, if λ_(c)>λ_(1A), access to thecredential c read or write value is denied.

The table shown in FIG. 6 summarizes, for each access type as defined inthe table of FIG. 1, the credential encryption keys and the independentvalues from which these are derived.

FIG. 7 shows encrypted parts of the member profile. Credential publicand private keys are encrypted with credential public and private keyencryption keys of the same MLA level as the credential. Public andprivate key encryption keys are encrypted with the I&A derived key ofthe same level. The rest of the encrypted profile is encrypted with thePEK. The PEK is encrypted once for each MLA level using the I&A derivedkey of each level.

FIG. 8 shows the process of decrypting the profile. The member logs onusing an I&A process that corresponds to MLA level 1. This level can bechosen by the member before logging in, can be dictated by the MLA levelof an encrypted object, or can be specified for an application by thedomain authority. A key is derived from the I&A events. This keydecrypts the ePEK_(λ) to recover the PEK, exek_(λ) to recover xek_(λ)and eyek_(λ) to recover yek_(λ). The profile is then decrypted with thePEK, credential private keys of MLA level λ are decrypted with xek_(λ),and credential public keys of MLA level λ are decrypted with yek_(λ).

Maintenance of Profile Keys

Periodically, cryptographic keys should be change. This applies to theI&A derived keys, profile encryption keys, and the credential public andprivate key encryption keys. Strategies to deal with key changes arediscussed below.

I&A Derived Keys

An I&A event at one level is independent of I&A at other levels.Therefore, κ_(i) can be changed easily without affecting any other κ_(j)where i≠j. Simply decrypt the encrypted credential private and publickey encryption keys, namely, exek_(λ) and eyek_(λ), with the old κ_(λ)to recover xek and yek. Then generate a new κ_(λ) and re-encrypt withthis key to generate the new exek_(λ) and eyek_(λ).

Profile Encryption Key and Initialization Vector

The profile must first be decrypted, then a new PEK and PIV generated atrandom, and finally re-encryption of the profile with the new key and IVtakes place. Then the new PEK must be re-encrypted with κ_(λ), for eachλ. However, only one κ_(λ) is known during the session in which the PEKis being changed.

To allow decryption of the PEK during the next session, which can be ofa different I&A level, the new PEK is encrypted with the old PEK foreach I&A level. This value is called ePEK′. After opening a session witha new I&A level, the encrypted PEK for the new I&A level can becalculated and stored. To simplify the process, a new PEK should not begenerated until the previous PEK has been re-encrypted under all I&Alevels. This leads to the following procedures.

Initial Change of PEK During a Session of I&A Level λ:

First, open a session with I&A level λ. Next, check to see if the oldencrypted PEK, ePEK′, is zero. If it is zero, then a new PEK can begenerated. If it is not zero, then stop the PEK update process and go tothe next action. Generate a new PEK and re-encrypt the entire profilewith this new PEK. If the new randomly-generated PEK is zero, thenchoose a new PEK. Next, encrypt the old PEK under the new PEK andreplace ePEK′ with this value. Encrypt the PEK with κ_(λ) as the key andreplace the old ePEK_(λ) with this new value. Then, initialize a Booleanchange table (the PEK change table) to all zeros. Each entry in the PEKchange table represents one I&A level. Next, set the value in the PEKchange table of the entry corresponding to I&A level λ.

Subsequent sessions of I&A Level i where i≠λ:

First, open a session with I&A level i. Next, check the entrycorresponding to I&A level i in PEK change table. If this entry is set,then check all entries to see if they are set. If all entries are set,then erase the old encrypted PEK, that is, set ePEK′ to zero andcontinue as normal. If the entry is not set, then continue with the nextaction. Decrypt ePEK_(i) with key κ_(i) to recover the old PEK, anddecrypt ePEK′ with the old PEK as the key to recover the new PEK. Next,encrypt the PEK with κ_(i) as the key and replace the old ePEKi withthis new value. Then, set the value in the PEK change table of the entrycorresponding to I&A level i.

Credential Public and Private Key Encryption Keys

Changing a credential key encryption key is more involved. Depending onaccess type, credential key encryption keys can have dependences on eachother for different I&A levels. Therefore, it might not be possible tochange just one credential key encryption key; the sequence ofcredential key encryption keys for all I&A levels might have to bechanged all at once. However, if credential keys, either public orprivate, are partitioned or exempt from MLA, then one can proceed asabove for the PEK.

For access down, only credential key encryption keys below the currentI&A level can be accessed. Therefore, the session must be in the highestI&A level to allow changing of these credential key encryption keys.Similarly, for access up, the session must be in the lowest I&A level tochange this type of credential key encryption keys.

Because only one κ_(λ) is known during a session, knowing just thecredential key encryption keys for all I&A levels will not suffice. Astrategy similar to changing the PEK is needed. This is done by usingthe old credential key encryption key of the same I&A level to encryptthe new credential key encryption key. Since there are both private andpublic credential keys, two lists of old credential key encryption keysmust be kept. If a zero is used in the list for a key corresponding toan I&A level that has already been changed, then a separate Boolean listsuch as the one above for the PEK change table does not have to bemaintained.

In the following exemplary procedures, only one old credential keyencryption key list is mentioned. This list represents either the publicor private credential key encryption key lists or both. The term CEK_(λ)represents any credential key encryption key—either public or private—ofI&A level λ.

Initial Change of the Credential Key Encryption Key During a Session ofI&A Level λ, where λ is Either 1 for Access up, or λ_(max) for AccessDown:

First, open a session with I&A level λ. λ must be 1 for access up orλ_(max) for access down. If not, then stop the CEK update process. Next,check to see if the old encrypted CEK for all I&A levels is zero. Ifthey are zero, then the CEK can be updated. If the list is not zero,then stop the CEK update process. Next, generate a new CEK_(λ) andgenerate CEK for all of the other I&A levels according to eqs. (11).Also, generate the old CEKs for all of the I&A levels. The old CEKs willbe used later in the procedure. Then, re-encrypt the new CEK_(λ) withκ_(λ) as the key, and update this value in the profile. Also update theencrypted credential keys for level λ by decrypting them with the oldCEK and re-encrypting them with the new CEK. Then, store value zero inthe old CEK list at the entry corresponding to I&A level %. Then, forevery i=2 through λ_(max) (for access up), or for every i=λ_(max)−1through 1 (for access down), encrypt the new CEKi with the old CEKi asthe key, and copy the previous value to the old CEK list at the entrycorresponding to I&A level i.

Subsequent Sessions of I&A level i where i≠λ, Where λ is Either 1 forAccess Up, or λ_(max) for Access Down:

First, open a session with I&A level i. Next, decrypt eCEKi with κ_(λ)as the key to recover CEKi. Then, check the entry corresponding to I&Alevel i in the old CEK list. That is, if the entry in the list is zero,then the CEKi from the previous step is the new CEKi. In this case,break from this procedure and continue normal processing. On the otherhand, if the entry is not zero, then the CEKi from the previous step isthe old CEKi. In this case, decrypt the entry with the old CEKi as thekey to recover the new CEKi. Then store zero in the old CEK list at theentry corresponding to I&A level i. Next, encrypt the new CEKi withκ_(λ) as the key and update the old CEKi value. Then decrypt all of thecredential keys of I&A level i with the old CEKi, re-encrypt them withthe new CEKi, and update the old value.

Computing a Random Value Encryption Key

Computing Shared Values

From the set of available credentials, A, the set of chosen credentialswill be represented by S⊂A. A Diffie-Hellman ephemeral key pair isgenerated during object encryption. The shared value for each credentialis then computed. For encryption, the Z_(i) are calculated fromcredential public keys and the ephemeral private key,∀iεS Z _(i) =Y _(i) ^(r)modp _(c)  (13a)

For decryption, the Z_(i) are calculated from credential private keysand the ephemeral public key,∀iεS Z _(i) =t ^(Xi)modp _(c)  (13b)Computing the REK Using One Credential Per Category

Using one credential per category, the REK is calculated byREK=H′(T, 00000001₁₆ , o)  (14)

where T isT=∥ _(iεS) Z _(i)  (15)

and the concatenation is performed in order of increasing i. The otherinformation, o, iso=∥ _(iεS) cid _(i)  (16)

where (similar to above) the concatenation is performed in order ofincreasing c.

Computing the REK Using More Than One Credential Per Category

Using more than one credential per category will result in severalpieces of information to be sent or kept with the encrypted object inthe header. The threshold method is described here for illustrativepurposes; the lockbox method is not described in detail, but can be usedinstead. See FIG. 4 and the related description for an overview of thethreshold method.

For each MCSC, represented as d, a shared key, K_(d)<p_(c) and acoefficient, a_(d)<p_(c)−1, are generated at random. Let the number ofcredentials chosen in category d be s_(d). A total of s_(d)+1 valueswill be generated and these values will be denoted as x_(jd), where0≦j≦s_(d). The values are generated as follows:

x_(0d)=c_(max)+1. The value c_(max) is the maximum number of credentialsthat are possible in the system.

x_(1d)=the credential ID of the credential in category d with the lowestcredential index.

x_(2d)=the credential ID of the credential in category d with thesecond-lowest credential index.

x_(jd)=the credential ID of the credential in category d with the j^(th)lowest credential index.

Next, s_(d)+1 shares, called σ_(jd), where 0≦j≦s_(d), are calculated:0≦j≦s_(d) σ_(jd)=(K _(d) +a _(d) x _(jd))mod p _(c)  (17)

The share encrypting keys, SEK_(j), are computed from the shared values,Z_(i):1≦j≦s_(d) SEK _(j) =H′(Z _(i), 00000001₁₆ , i)  (18)

where the i is the index of the credential that corresponds to thej^(th) chosen credential in the category.

The shares are then encrypted using the SEKs and are put in the header.Let ε_(j) represent the encrypted share, then1≦j≦s_(d) ε_(j) =e(σ_(jd) , SEK _(j))  (19)

The first share, σ_(0d), does not get encrypted; it appears in theheader as plaintext.

The REK is calculated byREK=H′(T, 00000001₁₆ , o)  (20)

where T isT=∥ _(dεS) K _(d)  (21)

and the concatenation is performed in order of increasing d. The otherinformation, o, is formed byo=∥ _(dεS) d  (22)

where (similar to above) the concatenation is performed in order ofincreasing d.

In a mixed situation, where some categories have multiple credentialsselected and some have only one, the T value is formed from a mix ofK_(d) and Z_(i) (in increasing order of category).

For decryption, the Diffie-Hellman shared values are first calculated.For multiple credentials in a category, only the first one that themember has read access for is needed. If the member has read access tonone of the credentials used in an MCSC, then access to the encryptedobject is denied.

Shared values are calculated from the private part of the credential keypairs and the public part of the ephemeral key pair, according to eq.(13b). Then the share encryption keys are calculated from theDiffie-Hellman shared values, according to eq. (18). The SEKs can thenbe used to decrypt the threshold shares:1≦j≦s_(d) σ_(jd) =d(ε_(j) , SEK _(j))  (23)

The first threshold share, σ_(0d), for a category is taken from theheader, because it is plaintext. With the first threshold share and anyother (decrypted) share within category d, the shared key, K_(d), can becalculated.1≦j≦s_(d) K _(d)=σ₀ −x _(0d)(σ_(0d) −σ _(jd))/(x _(0d) −x _(jd))modp_(c)  (24)

When all of the shared keys have been recovered, the REK is calculatedaccording to eqs. (20) through (22), and the random component is thenrecovered. Once the random component is recovered, the working key canbe reconstructed and the encrypted object can be decrypted.

The One Random Value per Category Method

For each MCSC, represented as i, 128 random bits are generated. Thesevalues will be referred to as REK_(i). The random value encryption key,REK, is computed as the exclusive-OR result of all of the REK_(i)REK=⊕ ₁ ^(d) REK _(i)  (25)

Each REK_(i) is encrypted with AES for each credential in the ithcategory before being transmitted with the encrypted object. Theencrypted REK_(i) for credential j is denoted EREK_(ji), therefore,EREK _(ji) =e(REK _(i) , K _(ji))  (26)

where K_(ji) is the key associated with the jth chosen credential incategory i. The K_(ji) are computed by using the combiner key derivationfunction described previously,K _(ji) =H′(Z _(ji), 00000001₁₆ ,j)  (27)

where Z_(ji) is the Diffie-Hellman shared value corresponding to the jthcredential in category i. These shared values are computed from thecredential public keys, Y_(ji), and the ephemeral private key, r:∀iεSεd Z _(ij) =Y _(j) ^(r)modp _(c)  (28a)

For decryption, the shared values are calculated from the credentialprivate keys, X_(ji), and the ephemeral public key, t:∀iεSεd Z _(ji) =t ^(Xji)modp _(c)  (28b)

1-7. (canceled)
 8. In an access system, a method of securing an objectat an access level, comprising: receiving, from a user, a profile keyencryption key corresponding to the access level; selecting an object tosecure; selecting a profile associated with the user, wherein theprofile includes a domain value, an encrypted profile encryption key,and a credential, wherein the credential includes an encryptedcredential public key, an encrypted credential public key encryptionkey, and a multiple-level access identifier; selecting the credentialbased on a comparison of the access level and the access identifier;generating a working key, including generating a random value, andbinding at least the domain value and the random value together to formthe working key; and encrypting the object with the working key.
 9. Themethod of claim 8, further comprising: generating a random valueencryption key, including decrypting the encrypted credential public keyencryption key with at least the profile key encryption key, decryptingthe encrypted credential public key with at least the decryptedcredential public key encryption key, generating an ephemeral key pairincluding an ephemeral private key and an ephemeral public key,generating a shared value based on at least the ephemeral private keyand the decrypted credential public key, and generating the random valueencryption key based on at least the shared value; encrypting the randomvalue with at least the random value encryption key; and providing theencrypted object, the ephemeral public key, and the encrypted randomvalue for an authorized recipient.